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Knowledge in microbiology is reaching an extreme level of diversification and complexity,
which paradoxically results in a strong reduction in the intelligibility of microbial life.
In our days, the “score of life” metaphor is more accurate to express the complexity
of living systems than the classic “book of life.” Music and life can be represented
at lower hierarchical levels by music scores and genomic sequences, and such
representations have a generational influence in the reproduction of music and life.
If music can be considered as a representation of life, such representation remains
as unthinkable as life itself. The analysis of scores and genomic sequences might
provide mechanistic, phylogenetic, and evolutionary insights into music and life, but
not about their real dynamics and nature, which is still maintained unthinkable, as
was proposed by Wittgenstein. As complex systems, life or music is composed by
thinkable and only showable parts, and a strategy of half-thinking, half-seeing is needed
to expand knowledge. Complex models for complex systems, based on experiences
on trans-hierarchical integrations, should be developed in order to provide a mixture of
legibility and imageability of biological processes, which should lead to higher levels of
intelligibility of microbial life.
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INTRODUCTION
Life is a highly complex system, including the most complex
objects in the known universe (Bedau, 1996). The genomics
revolution has catapulted molecular biology, and particularly
microbiology (Westerhoff and Palsson, 2004), into the realms of
systems biology approaches to complex systems. Such a trend
was based on the growing compelling intuition of the need of
scaling-up molecular biology, in a new age of synthesis requir-
ing formal integrative tools (Baquero, 2004, 2009). Biochemistry
and lately Molecular Biology have shown that certain distinctive
carbon-based macromolecules play a crucial role in the vital pro-
cesses of all known living entities, but life seems to be more in
the nature of a process (Bedau, 1996). The epistemological prob-
lem is how to cross the gap transitions between successive levels
of understanding that corresponds to the different hierarchical
levels of the complex system of life. Microbiologists are the best
positioned scientists to respond to such a challenge, as they are
familiar with “multiple-levels biology,” dealing simultaneously
with microbial collectives and collective genomes, as in metage-
nomics (Moya et al., 2012), cell-to-cell interactions (including
pathogenesis, Desnues et al., 2010), the flowing biology of sub-
cellular mobile genetic elements (Beiko et al., 2005) and finally
with the wealth of gene-gene epistatic interactions (Babu et al.,
2009).
Microbial communities, species, clones, plasmids, trans-
posons, integrons, and genes are evolutionary individuals trac-
ing their evolutionary trajectories at different hierarchical levels
(Baquero, 2011). Such trans-hierarchical network-like complex-
ity simply eliminates the possibility of identification of simple
causal structures, if they ever exist out of our ways of represen-
tation (Schrodinger, 1957). The hope of a simple answer to the
classic Baconian question in science “What is the cause of . . . ” has
no sense any more, and in fact the complex structure of biologi-
cal processes constitute the major challenge for Biological Theory
(Callebaut and Laubichler, 2007).
The challenge is not only to deal with quantitative inte-
gration of elements across these major hierarchical transitions
in microbiology, or in biology at large (Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry, 1997), but to eventually discover general principles
of microbial life rather of just keep on descriptions (Westerhoff
and Palsson, 2004). Such scaling-up process of understanding
resembles the escalation from the forms of a language (as lex-
ical or syntactic) toward its meaning (semantics) (Steels, 2004,
2010; Rosen, 2004). Interestingly, the trade-off between these
hierarchical levels in a shared world has been defined as intel-
ligibility in linguistic theory (Komarova and Niyogi, 2004). In
his primary sense, the word intelligibility reflects the possibil-
ity of such a trans-hierarchical understanding. St. Thomas even
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derives the Latin word intelligere from intus legere, or “reading
into”; even if the origin were inter legere, the term stresses the
need of reading beyond the words and sentences, in another
cognitive dimension, to reach the meaning. Accordingly to the
Cato’s classic sentence, “legere, et non intelligere, neglegere est,”
that is, “as good not read, as not to understand.” In this work,
we use the word “intelligibility” as the construction of meaningful
(thinkable) models in response to the assimilation of knowl-
edge (clear-and-distinct or fuzzy), and able to reflect to a certain
extent the reality of complex natural systems, as those which
are the objects of biological sciences. The conversion of data
into knowledge constitutes a great challenge for future biologi-
cal research (Brenner, 2010). In fact intelligibility is a prerequisite
to developing modern biology grounded on a sound epistemol-
ogy (Dougherty and Bittner, 2010). “Legere, et non intelligere,
neglegere est”. Two thousand years after Cato, Albert Einstein
formulated essentially the same idea: “Science without epistemol-
ogy is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled”
(Einstein, 1949).
Metaphors are frequently used by scientists as “non-logic”
epistemological aids to think about reality (De Man, 1978).
Biologists have long made use of linguistic metaphors in describ-
ing and naming cellular processes, and in particular involving
from DNA as language to genome as a “book of life.” The cur-
rent questions are: (1) if these apparently immediate analogies
might result in a deeper possibility of analysis of genetic-genomic
structures using methods that have been developed in linguistic
research; and (2) if such an analysis will enable to understand the
general principles and processes of life, and even (not entering
here again in the universal’s problem) life itself as a intelligible
entity.
The image of genome as a “book of life” has attracted popu-
lar imagination, but it is obvious that the knowledge of the entire
genomic sequence of Haemophilus influenzae (Fleischmann et al.,
1995) or Homo sapiens (McPherson et al., 2001; International
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2004) has not resulted
in a much deeper understanding of the “life” clues of these organ-
isms. This occurs not only because of our gaps in understanding
the function of all genes and the complexities of regulatory
and epigenetic interactions between genes and other meaningful
sequences. Probably the human way of reading a text is sim-
pler than the cell way of reading. Human language texts are
read in one way only, sequentially and involving all charac-
ters. Genetic texts are “read” by cellular mechanisms in several
different ways, each time using a different selection of the char-
acters of the same text while skipping others. Indeed the “score
of life” could be a better image of the genomic language. A
score is a series of staves on which all the different instrumen-
tal and/or vocal parts of a musical work are written, one under
the other in vertical alignment, so that the parts may be read
simultaneously.
But in this report we consider there exist even bigger difficul-
ties to predict how relevant is deciphering the language of genes,
the “book of life.” One key epistemological problem is to dis-
cuss about our ability to clarify the possible relations between the
structure of a possible language (genetic and genomic sequences)
and the characteristics of life of particular organisms, which seem
to be determined by this language. Obviously this is a prob-
lem of reductionism (Wimsatt, 1976)—might the understanding
of life be reduced to the understanding of the genetic-genomic
language?
In the way of thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and even more
sharply in his friend and commenter, Moritz Schlick (Schlick,
1936), the meaning of the word “life” can only be shown, not
understood and consequently not clearly expressed in proposi-
tions. It might sound paradoxical to attach to this statement in
the age of glory of genomics, proteomics, and metabolomics. Life
is a fact that can be shown (but not defined by) as something like a
moving and loosely integrated complex of contingent structures,
each one of them (and the complex itself) tending to be sequen-
tially replaced by similar forms, and displaying various degrees of
changes in variability and complexity both during almost instan-
taneous and long-term periods of time. Note that because we are
here only showing life, this description does not assure that we are
not confronted with non-living structures with similar properties,
and certainly that any notion of progress or purposiveness cannot
be considered here. Nevertheless, as the human observers, we are
not neutral in the process of selecting what we would like to show,
as frequently we are confronted with a non-descriptible feeling of
sharing a common quality (“animation?”) with what we tend to
show as living things.
THE “SCORE OF LIFE” METAPHOR
The Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus logico-philosophicus,” pub-
lished in English in 1922 under the guidance of Bertrand
Russell, is widely recognized as one of the main post-kantian
approaches devoted to explore the possibilities of human knowl-
edge of natural world (Wittgenstein, 1921). In its theorem 4.0141,
Wittgenstein compares music scores and gramophone (DVDs, in
our times) with music.
4.0141
In the fact that there is a general rule by which the musi-
cian is able to read the symphony out of the score, and
that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the
symphony from the line on a gramophone record and
from this again—by means of the first rule—construct
the score, herein lies the internal similarity between these
things which at first sight seem to be entirely different.
And the rule is the law of projection which projects the
symphony into the language of the musical score. It is the
rule of translation of this language into the language of
the gramophone record.
The order and qualities of the musical notes in the score, the
grooves’ irregularities in the gramophone record, in summary, the
“language” from which music might be reproduced, is not music,
but has an internal similarity with music. Much longer before the
discovery of the genetic code, the Wittgenstein’s theorem 4.0141
recalls the main structural feature of living organisms. The pro-
cess of reading the score (genetic language), produces music (life);
conversely, music can be converted, translated, by a “law of pro-
jection” into a musical score, and from this again music might
be reconstructed. Without internal similarities, these transitions
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between series of objects “that at first sight seem to be entirely
different” should be simply impossible.
Interestingly in music, as in life, the description of “what
is said” beyond the individual sounds is obscure. As the clas-
sic question of Erwin Schrodinger what is Life? The question:
what is Music? refuses precise answers. No propositions are trans-
mitted by music to describe clear and distinct facts, able to be
thought (logically considered) by human mind. There is, as in
genetics, a certain “arithmetic order” of notes that is required to
produce obscure final effects. In Leibnitz words: “exercitium arith-
meticae occultum nesciendis se numere animi” (Leibnitii epistolae,
collectio Kortholdi, ep. 154), that is, music is as an unconscious
arithmetic’s exercise in which mind do not know what is being
counted.
Maybe one of the difficulties of thinking life using linguistic
structures is the fluid, dynamic nature of life. Languages, music
score or genetic-genomic sequences, are essentially static. A book,
or a musical score, or a genome sequence can be indefinitely
stored without any alteration, and even more, without produc-
ing any effect (except covering a small parcel of physical space).
On the contrary, speech, music, or life, are essentially dynamic;
without movement they ceases existing. The fact that linguistic
structures “contain” potential dynamicity does not make them
dynamic at all; indeed they are practically nothing by themselves.
The key-fact is that between languages and dynamic phenomena
an interpretative intermediary should be interposed. The music
score gives rise to music only if interpreters are available, musi-
cians (four in a string quartet) able to read the language and
converting it into sounds. Indeed a music score has an ordered
internal structure, for instance following the rules of harmony,
but, at first sight, we could conclude that in the absence of cor-
rect interpretation, a music score cannot be differentiated from a
random sequence of notes.
Let us now imagine an out-of-Earth scientist examining a
music score. He has no idea about notes, instruments, or sounds,
even about the existence of music at all. Probably he will be able
to differentiate a music score from a random sequence of notes.
Some notations (notes) are preferentially linked to other ones,
some conserved and iterated sequences are recognizable, the role
of black and white notes seems not identical, some occur more
frequently than others when accompanying the name a particu-
lar instrument (unknown). The note’s frequency per decimeter
of score apparently depends on some mysterious words at the
margin as “Andante scherzoso quasi alegretto,” that nevertheless
might provide a “living equivalent.” He could conclude that the
musical score has a linguistic structure, potentially leading to an
unknown type of dynamic behavior. If the out-of-Earth scientist
could had access to a high number of different scores, he could
even trace different schools, authors, influences, even a history of
this unknown language—and probably he will not be much far
from reality. In summary, an analytical “science” of this language
could be built, and that in the total absence of knowledge about
the nature of music.
Now note that the mirror process of analysis is also possible. In
that case our second out-of-Earth scientist is observing the per-
formance of a music group playing the Schubert’s Piano Trio in B
flat, D. 898. Unfortunately, he does not know about the existence
of music, as he is unable to hear any sound, but he is able to distin-
guish the keys, bows, and strings of the different instruments and
he can precisely record any movement of the player’s arms and
fingers on these structures. A representation of these movements
during time should produce something similar to the musical
score of the Piano Trio. Indeed the precise record of these move-
ments might substitute themusical score, andwhen applied to the
instruments should reproduce the music. As in the previous case,
a collection of this type of records could lead to tracing schools or
authors, or a history, or even a science of this language—without
knowing what music is at all.
But we can also conceive a third out-of-Earth scientist, able to
hear the sounds and to correlate them with the instruments and
the movements of the players. It might well happen that the sci-
entist could perceive the separate sounds, but he is either unable
to link them in his mind as significant ensembles (melodies), or
the sounds are so different in his brain than in ours, that our har-
mony is totally useless for his sensibility, and out of any esthetical
possibility. As in the previous cases, this scientist could be able
to study the history of music, without understanding at all what
music is.
The essential is to discuss if a particular sequence of written
musical notations, or sounds, or hands and finger movements,
has only themeaning of “music” when understood by a particular
type of sensibility. Even more: we can replace the “out-of-Earth”
scientists by musicians, which will be able to reproduce the
music without knowing anything about its nature, and without
experimenting any of the effects that music might cause in the
appropriate sensibility. They are in a “Chinese room” situation, in
which the (considered to be intelligent) intermediate within the
closed room receives below the door messages in an unknown
language, but accordingly to a set of rules, he is able to pro-
duce responses in the same unknown language (Searle, 1984). It
is obvious that the music score, or the genome sequence, is totally
unaware of its function in the process of life, and the same is
true for other possible intermediaries, for instance, involved in
protein translation. In the words of Sydney Brenner, “genomes
do not contain in any explicit form anything at a higher level
than genes” (Brenner, 1999), or, paraphrasing Leibnitz when
describing monads, “genomes do not have windows.”
Therefore, neither from the outside, in which life can only be
shown (and even that, without certitude), nor from the inside
(life is invisible for life-determining structures), life seems to be
thinkable. “We feel that even if all possible scientific questions
be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at
all. Of course there is then no question left and just this is the
answer” (Theorem 6.52). In other words, the answer is that to
ask ourselves for the meaning of life is a false question, that is,
there is nothing to think about. “For an answer which cannot be
expressed the question too cannot be expressed” (6.5). And, as
stated in the last sentence of the Tractatus, “Where of one cannot
speak, thereof one must be silent” (6.54). The main interest of the
“score of life” metaphor is probably that both life and music can
be shown (as something that seems to impose a reality), but not
thought (we cannot say anything about its reality), as the genomic
sequences or the musical scores are mere representations of these
obscure realities.
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THINKABILITY OF LIFE
If life can be only shown, is Ludwig Wittgenstein right? Have the
terms “Biology” and their derivatives, as “Microbiology,” intrin-
sic epistemological contradictions? Are they non-sense proposals?
We arrive now to an apparent contradiction. On one hand, we
could reach the notion that life is unthinkable. But, as stated in
3.02, “the though contains the possibility of the state of affairs
which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible.” On the other
hand, life is perceived as a fact, therefore not only possible, but a
realized entity. Obviously, if it exists, it should be thinkable. If life
is not thinkable, either life does not exist, or has an unveiled, hid-
den reality. This antinomy is a clear variation of the Kantian ones,
based on the confusion between the spheres of phenomena and
noumena, and encapsulates the main problem that is discussed in
this assay. Life is perceived, even experienced as a fact, but it is not
a fact, it is not an entity. If that proposition were true, life should
not be an object of natural science. Limiting the thinkable and
thereby the unthinkable, philosophy limits the disputable sphere
of natural science (Wittgenstein again, see 4.113–4.114).
Natural science should be thinkable and speakable. Everything
that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that
can be said can be said clearly (4.116). If life is unthinkable, but if
it had a reality, we should think on “pictures of life” using artic-
ulated propositions, which are “models of reality as we think it
is” (4.01). “The proposition constructs a world with the help of
a logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the
proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is
true” (4.023). Wittgenstein’s propositions could be considered as
something derived from the combinatorial and ordered nature
of structures as the musical score (3.141), or, in the life context
genomes, again “representing” the (suspected) reality, but unable
to represent what they have in common with reality (4.12). The gap
is maintained between the unthinkable but presumed reality (life)
and the thinkable picture of it (proposition).
Life is as thinkable as music is thinkable. In both cases, there
is what Wittgenstein calls a certain “experience of meaning.”
Understanding life andmusic is to perceive “fine shades” of mean-
ing. Intuitively both music and life seems to be meaningful, but
in both cases they seem to be resistant to any “semantic” treat-
ment. It has always been difficult to see how “meaning” could
be fruitfully ascribed to music, as this notion is applied to lan-
guage (Bar-Elli, 2006). Obviously the understanding of music has
nothing to do with the ability to recreate in mind a memorized
melody, or to foresee in the concert hall the next variation of a
musical theme. We can say the same for life. We can predict, with
a certain confidence, what will happen in the next step, based on
our experiences, but that is not to understand—and even not to
think about life. Experiences might provide a flavor of causality,
following Hume, regularities in structured observations leads to
expectation (Dougherty and Bittner, 2010), but that is not real
understanding. We are just following something that we can only
show, in a sense, as the conductor of the orchestra is showing
with its baton, a kind of mixture of performance and unthinkable
matter.
This simultaneous experimentability and unthinkability of
music was analyzed in detail by Arthur Schopenhauer, in
one of the chapters of his seminal book “The World as Will
and Representation” (Schopenhauer, 1833). He stated that the
music, ignores the world of concrete phenomena, and there-
fore only resembles some original reality than cannot be copied.
Schopenhauer believes that music resembles, represents, “is a
copy of the will itself, the objectivity of which are the Ideas.”
He will underline after some paragraphs his convergence with
Leibniz. As stated before, “Musica est exercitiummetaphysics occul-
tum nesciendis se philosophari animi,” that is, music is an uncon-
scious exercise of metaphysics where the mind does not know
what is thinking about. Of course Schopenhauer is a vitalist, and
biologists will immediately recognize here the relation between
will and the obscure dynamics of life, and might immediately
reach the intuition that the will of music might be a copy, a repre-
sentation of the will of life. The effects of music on humans could
be derived from the recognition (let us accept here this platonic
term!) of something common between our obscure perception
of life and the music itself. Reinterpreting Schopenhauer, the will
represented in music is a representation of the will of life, that is,
a common will is independently perceived (can be shown) in both
the music and life. In principle, we cannot speak about represen-
tations between two entities of the same hierarchical order, in our
case, two equally unthinkable entities. It could be suggested that,
even among unthinkable entities, there may also exist a hierarchy,
so that entities that are lower in the hierarchy (music) might be
able to represent higher ones (life).
MAJOR TRANSITIONS: A TRANS-HIERARCHICAL CYCLE OF
REPRESENTATIONS AND REPRESENTED ENTITIES
Between the groove pattern and the music there is a “major tran-
sition,” essentially a qualitative transition. Similarly, between the
genes and the life of a bacterial cell, or between cells and the
complex living expressions of an ecologically-integrated com-
munity of cells, there are major transitions, as those identified
by Maynard Smith and Szathmàry in evolutionary processes
(Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1997). In both cases, there is
a collection of “small” parts that assemble to produce qualita-
tive different larger wholes. It is obviously tempting to propose
that the lower levels of the hierarchy blindly “represent” the
higher levels, as the way they are assembled (its order) has some-
thing formal, a correspondence, with the higher level activities.
Evolutionary biologists will be prone to accept that there are
“levels of life” as the development of life seems to occur from
single replicating molecules, which provided the bases for repro-
duction at higher levels, as cells or organisms, in a successive
series of “major evolutionary transitions.” But it will be diffi-
cult to accept that “lower levels” will be able to “represent” the
higher levels. That occurs because, if there is an general evolu-
tionary flow from the lower to the higher hierarchical levels, the
different entities at the higher levels of life categorically imposes
particular organizations of lower levels. Indeed processes as speci-
ation depends on the imperatives of higher over lower hierarchical
levels.
The continuous interplay between hierarchical levels is a trade-
mark of life (Campbell, 1974). Some kind of unity based on
reciprocal trans-hierarchical effects occurs there between what
is represented and the representation itself. Indeed it is easy to
imagine that the life of a particular bacterial organism is to a
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certain extent represented in the organization of ifs genome, as
the music of a particular Mozart’s string-quartet is represented
in the organization of its musical score. But note that in both
cases the representation is a “generational representation” for
the represented entity, that is, the re-production of a particular
bacterial organism or string quartet is entirely dependent from
the representation, the genome, or the score, respectively. On
the other hand, the score is meaningless in producing music in
the absence of an instrument. In modern times (the origin of
life might be another case), the genetic sequences (the represen-
tation) are only meaningful if a specific living system (what is
represented) is present. Themeaning of the representation should
be perceived by the living system, which produces a biological
scaffold (an instrument) at its turn generates its own represen-
tation, what is required for reproduction. The higher hierarchical
level (the living system) has the lead in the process, as there is
no representation without anything to be represented. That fits
with the common wisdom in biology: the content and order of
sequences in the genome corresponds to what has been selected
by life itself, the complex and dynamic living interplay between
the cell and its environment. For instance, speciation requires
the dominance of “what it is represented,” the adapted phe-
notype, over a particular genome. Essentially genetic plasticity
and modularity expresses such subordination. We found here an
interesting trans-hierarchical cyclic correlation between represen-
tation and reproduction, a correlation that is produced blindly in
both senses, as in the metaphor of the messages crossing a Chinese
room (see above). Indeed we suspect that in ancient evolutionary
times there was no difference between what was represented and
the representation itself, the evolution of life consisting in digging
a “major hierarchical transition” between both entities.
How that model applies for the music score? We should admit
that the score, being the representation of music, produces music
only if there is an instrument that converts notes into sounds,
and only if there is somebody with an “experiment, in a sense,
to understand (even in an unthinkable way) the meaning of
the music. Because of its experiential capacity, and the derived
effects of such kind of understanding, the human being listening
music (higher in the hierarchy) is able to produce suitable instru-
ments for reproducing again something from himself, perhaps the
obscure will of Schopenhauer. The metaphor resists: the music
score represents something unthinkable, this will, and the subject
of the will (life in general, or a human mind) produces represen-
tations to perpetuate the re-presence of the effects associated with
the will.
THINKING ON REPRESENTATIONS
The major task of science is to explore and expand the limits of
intelligibility. The main current task of biology is to understand
the correspondences between genomes and life. (Lewontin, 1974;
Ferrada and Wagner, 2012; Wagner, 2012a,b). A representation
is based on correspondences between what is represented and the
representation itself. The representation cannot be at the same
hierarchical level than that what is being represented. What might
be the correspondences between life or music, and the artifactual
representation of these presumed realities, as genomic sequences
or musical scores? Let us go back to the Tractatus. “It is clear that,
however, different from the real one an imagined world may be, it
must have something—a form—in common with the real world”
(2.022). What it is common are the forms. “We make (our logic,
our language) to ourselves pictures of facts” (2.1). This picture is
a representation of the facts, in which the elements of the pic-
ture correspond to the objects (2.13), linked in a definite way
accordingly to what it is imposed by their forms (2.14), and log-
ically indicates the possible non-existence of some facts (2.11).
The picture, the representation of the reality, is in itself a fact
(2.141), “as the elements of the picture are combined with another
in a definite way, representing that real things are so combined
with another” (2.15; 2.15.14). These co-ordinations are as it were
the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality
(2.1515). “What the picture must have in common with reality
in order to be able to represent it after is manner—rightly or
falsely—is its form of representation” (2.17). In summary, “the
picture has the logical form of representation in common what it
pictures” (2.2). All that certainly has a certain platonic flavor, as
the picture, the representation, can be something made by draw-
ing the shadow of the reality on our mind’s screen. Biology is the
art and science of finding the forms able to represent life.
As any other type of knowledge, biology should be based on
propositions. Only propositions have sense; only in the context
of a proposition has a name meaning (3.3). Propositions do not
have meaning, but sense, reflecting all possible situations they
represent. Only the relations, the order matter, not the things, not
the objects themselves. A proposition is the description of a fact
(4.023), a fact that involves objects. The possibility of represen-
tation of the reality (the task of sciences) is based, accordingly to
Wittgenstein, in the theorem (1.1) of the Tractatus: the world is
constituted by the totality of facts, not of things (Theorem 1.1).
The fact, if it is the case, exist as an elementary (atomic) fact
(1.21-2), resulting from a (minimal) particular combination of
objects (2.01). Objects are simple (2.02), elementary, fixed (2.026)
entities. But the objects by themselves, outside facts, are only pos-
sibilities of facts, nothing in reality (2.011) except their forms,
qualities to be part of facts (2.0141). These qualities determine
the possibility of facts (2.012): “objects contain the possibility
of all states of affairs” (2.014). The object is the fixed, the exis-
tent; the configuration is the changing, the variable (2.0271). In
the elementary fact objects hang one in another, like the links of
a chain (2.03), combined in a definite way (2.031). The way in
which objects hang together in the fact is the structure of the fact
(2.032). And finally: the form (of objects) is the possibility of the
structure (2.033).
Examining theseWittgenstein’s theorems, amicrobiologist will
immediately be attracted and even moved by the idea that the
philosopher is speaking about life, with all its unveiled evolution-
ary possibilities, based on alternative molecular configurations
that give rise to different facts, a game in which molecules them-
selves are nothing: the objects by themselves, outside facts, are only
possibilities of facts. If Biology is the art and science of repre-
senting life, such representation should be sufficiently faithful to
reflect the complexity and the dynamics of facts in the unthink-
able real life, and, understanding the links in the representation
(the model) we should assume that something “similar” should
occur, at least in part, in the true life.
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THE EFFECTS OF REPRESENTATIONS FROM ZEUXIS TO
SCHUBERT
In the fifth century BC, Zeuxis depicted the grapes so realisti-
cally that birds flew down to peck them: Ars simiae Naturae. In
this example, grapes are considered by birds to be alive, so that
the representation not only faithfully corresponds to life, but pro-
duces the same effects. Modifying in the model (the picture) the
shape or color of the grapes, the birds will not be attracted any-
more, so that we could presume which is the attractive properties
of real grapes. Of course the result of the experiment can be
wrong. For instance, birds could be attracted in the picture by
the odor of oil or egg used as a solvent of a particular dry used to
paint the grapes, and not by its realistic color. But the experiment
might also be true, and the birds could effectively be attracted by
the painted grapes. The representation has an effect, which might
be similar, or even identical, to the effect caused by what is repre-
sented. Now let us birds to examine for a little longer the famous
Zeuxis’s grapes. Certainly they will be soon disappointed, and
if challenged again by the image, they will not be attracted any
more. As in the famous Türing metaphor, life will recognize life,
provided a certain period of examination.
The idea of “music of life” has been developed recently by the
famous physiologist Dennis Noble (Noble, 2006). The authors
of the present essay were simultaneously disappointed and flat-
tered when he found that Noble used in his book “The Music of
Life” almost exactly the same example that we also used in the
first version of our manuscript, produced years ago, namely the
Schubert’s Piano Trio in E flat major, D.929; the author’s choice
was its ancestor, the Piano Trio in B flat, D.898. Noble even con-
sidered the space travelers metaphor, even though not entirely in
our way. The important thing is that all of us were impressed emo-
tionally by that piece of music. “As themusic entered into the slow
movement,” “I cried” confess Noble. Beyond any possible doubt,
music produces experiences and effects. If music were an unthink-
able representation of life, we are experiencing effects because this
representation provides an obscure perception of the will of life,
in the Schopenhauer sense. But note that if this perception will be
very difficult or impossible to obtain just looking at the score, or
the irregularities of the grooves of a gramophone record.
HALF-THINKING, HALF-SEEING
Ludwig Wittgenstein evolved in his posthumously pub-
lished book “Philosophical Investigations” (Wittgenstein, 1953;
McGuinn, 1997) to the proposal of some possible ways for under-
standing the realities that can be shown, but not thought, or at
least, not entirely thought. The experience of seeing something is
converted in a perceptual experience, and thus regarded as indis-
tinguishable from a thought (Bar-Elli, 2006). As Wittgenstein
says, “-is it a case of seeing and thinking? Or an amalgam of the
two, as I should almost like to say?” (PI 197). Let us imagine
a complex feature that can be only shown, as a human face.
The image of the face depends of a huge network of anatomical
interactions involving the shape of bones, the volume of the
muscles, the amount and distribution of subcutaneous fat, and
many other factors. But also these features reflect the age, the sex,
ethnicity, the diet, or even the character of the underlying human
being, so that the looking at this face might produce effects. A full
description of the dynamic network of elements giving rise to a
particular recognizable face will be almost impossible. Of course,
rough approximations might be attempted, as anthropologists
trying to reconstruct from the bones and the presumed diet the
face of Lucy, our hominid ancestor. But the example that we
are discussing here is that the aspect of the face that we see is
“condensed information” of a complex network of elementary
facts. Even more, without need of knowing almost anything of
the generational network of interactions giving rise to the face,
the face can be remembered and compared with other faces at an
extremely specific level of discrimination. The person recognizing
a face has an “experience of meaning.” As the face might reveal
family resemblances, Wittgenstein suggests a kinship between
seeing an aspect and the experience of meaning. The experience of
meaning is half-thinking (Bar-Elli, 2006).
Of course the musical metaphor is exploited by the later
Wittgenstein of “Last writings on the Philosophy of Psychology”
in an identical sense (Wittgenstein, 1949–1951; Worth, 1997).
Music results from a complex dynamic interplay of elements, has
not a clear semantic structure and, as the face, produces effects,
an experience of meaning that enable connections and comparisons.
For instance, he says about a musical theme: “I could compare
it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the
same pattern)” (I.382). The understanding of a musical theme
is based on the experience of what he defines as “internal rela-
tions” occurring in the otherwise “unthinkable” musical stuff.
Bar-Elli has pointed out the critical importance of the concept
of the experience of meaning in Wittgenstein as a part of a syn-
optic view (übersicht) of understanding (Bar-Elli, 2006). Music is
an excellent equivalent of life in terms of exploring intelligibil-
ity of complex systems, probably superior to language, precisely
because we seem to lack here any grip on an idea of semantic
units, which is so often conceived as the basis of linguistic analogy.
As the book of music cannot be reduced to the music score, and
then music is music, “my central argument is that the book of life
is life itself” says Dennis Noble (Noble, 2006). In conclusion, our
understanding of complex systems as life or music depends both
on: (1) the understanding of their representations (as genomes or
scores), and (2) the understanding (under the form of experience
of meaning) of something that can be only seen or show, but still
compared or connected. Half-thinking, half-seeing: the HT-HS
strategy.
IMPLEMENTING THE HT-HS STRATEGY: COMPLEX
MODELS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
How the HT-HS, half-thinking, half-seeing strategy could be
applied to increase the intelligibility of complex biological sys-
tems, and life in general? For the half-thinking part, it is obvious
that we should maintain a high-level descriptive research as it is
being done in genomics, proteomics, metabolomics, or transcrip-
tomics of particular organisms, complemented by the dynamic
approach provided by fluxomics, all within the frame of more
and more computationally advanced systems biology. All that
is research on the composition of Wittgensteinian atomic facts
and propositions; of course that includes certain level of synthe-
sis, what one of us (Moya et al., 2009) proposed to call synthetic
view one. This level is the level of anatomy and physiology, or, in
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linguistic terms, legibility. All these approaches essentially would
serve to provide material (organized material) to feed complex
models, able to move into the synthetic view two (Moya et al.,
2009). Possibly the advances in Systems Biology will provide use-
ful integrative models, but they will be insufficient to provide
by themselves full intelligibility of functional processes. Brenner
contend that this approach is insufficient, as deducing models of
function from the behavior of a complex system is an inverse
problem that is impossible to solve (Tarantola, 2006; Brenner,
2010).
The half-seeing part might start when we could be able of
developing more powerful model tools to run simultaneously all
data and processes generated by these—omics, in a comprehen-
sive and integrated way. For that a purpose we need “Big Science,”
based on the convergent interactions among scientists of many
disciplines, and not only from biology (Nurse, 2008). If we were
able to represent the holistic result of such synthetic approach,
we will be near something as a complex image of a living struc-
ture, able to be seen or to be showed. And more importantly,
able to be “physiognomically” compared and related with other
images obtained from other organisms. At this stage we should
reach imageability. The more advanced part of the half-seeing
part should be based on multi-hierarchical understanding of life,
and the expected appearance of emergent qualities, particularly if
communication strategies between levels are assured.
Modeling trans-hierarchical complex levels is certainly one of
the biggest challenges we have (Campbell, 1974; Martínez and
Moya, 2011). These models would eventually provide different
levels of predictability. Indeed predictability is the best touchstone
to validate the reality of complex models for complex systems
(Martínez et al., 2007). Maybe even complex models might be
able to predict just the next steps of biological processes, and only
in close space and time compartments, just as meteorological pre-
dictions based on cumulative empirical observations. Also, and as
we mentioned before (at least for non-atonal music) the experi-
ence allows to predict the evolution of a melody, at least for a few
compasses. In any case, complex models will serve to continu-
ously provide material to be tested and rejected when not mating
with reality (Brenner, 2010). We should in any case be aware that
to validate models by comparing them with “reality” might be a
circular problem, as the “reality” could be only defined by mod-
els. That is why we should be able to “see” the reality, even in an
obscure, fuzzy way. Paraphrasing Albert Einstein (Einstein, 1944;
Dougherty and Bittner, 2011) the propositions, the rationality
of the models (half-thinking) should be “firmly connected with
sensory experiences” (half-seeing).
As Denis Noble says, life should be considered in a vari-
ety of levels; life is “a kind of music, a symphonic interplay
between genes, cells, organs, body, and environment,” what can
be only examined under the views of synthetic biology (Noble,
2006). Microbiologists are among the best placed scientists to
mature these concepts, as they have daily experience of the com-
plex interplay of genetic sequences and domains, operons, genes,
proteins, macromolecular complexes, signaling networks, adap-
tive and regulatory functions, different classes of nested mobile
genetic elements, clones, species, communities, integrated micro-
biotic ensembles, and microbial ecology at large. We have to deal
with huge diversity of facts or pieces, constantly offering in a trans-
hierarchical way new complex patterns to evolutionary processes
(Baquero, 2004, 2009, 2011; Wagner, 2012a,b). In short, we hope
that the future will allow scientists to cover the three phases of this
epistemological process will be: legibility, imageability, and intel-
ligibility of complex biological systems. Mixing half-thinking and
half-seeing, the scientific method that might be we should apply
to understand the complexities of microbial life.
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